A brief overview of the Socratic method and Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language to define words.
In the Socratic dialogues, Socrates asks many times “What is X?”. X being courage, piety, justice, temperance or wisdom. The protagonists give him instances of these abstracts words as they try to come up with a definition. But Socrates rejects all of them; he always finds a use of the word which does not fit the given definition.
Socrates c. 470–399 BC
In Euthyphro, for instance, Socrates and Euthyphro attempt to establish a definitive meaning for the word piety. Socrates asks: “What is piety?”, to which Euthyphro replies that piety is what he is doing right now. Socrates rejects this definition, because Euthyphro’s action is merely an example and does not provide the essential characteristic that make pious actions pious. Euthyphro attempts to give four further definitions, but Socrates keeps questioning them (known as the Socratic questioning or Socratic method). Euthyphro ends up running out of patience and leaves Socrates without a clear definition of piety.
Socrates was seeking a common nature amongst the instances given to him to find a real definition. He believed the common nature justified the use of the common name, that it was unethical to use words if their meaning wasn’t truly known. For instance, one could only be just if one knew the underlying common nature in justice. But neither Socrates nor any of the protagonists of the Socratic dialogues ever manage to find true definitions. The unfinished work suggested philosophy still had much progress to make. In any case, Socrates believed that being aware of his ignorance made him wiser than those who, though ignorant, still claimed knowledge.
I know that I know nothing.
the Socratic paradox
Centuries later, Ludwig Wittgenstein would attempt to resume Socrates’ unfinished work. He believed, however, that the people’s approach to give instances of words was right.
I can characterize my standpoint no better than by saying that it is the antithetical standpoint to the one occupied by Socrates in the Platonic dialogues. For if I were asked what knowledge is, I would enumerate instances of knowledge and add the words ‘and similar things’. There is no shared constituent to be discovered since none exists.
Voices of Wittgenstein, Waismann & Wittgenstein, 2003, p. 33
Ludwig Wittgenstein 1889–1951
In Philosophical Investigations, he considers instances of the word game to illustrate his point.
Consider for example the proceedings that we call “games”. I mean board-games, card-games, ball-games, Olympic games, and so on. What is common to them all? Don’t say: “There must be something common, or they would not be called ‘games’” — but look and see whether there is anything common to all. — For if you look at them you will not see something that is common to all, but similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that. To repeat: don’t think, but look!
Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein, 1953, p. 31
Wittgenstein suggests to look instead of to think, and to describe instead of to explain. Thinking is an abstract process subject to the mind’s corrupted point of view, while looking is practical and avoids this bias. Wittgenstein argued that things, which could be thought to be connected by one essential common feature, may in fact be connected by a series of overlapping similarities, where no one feature is common to all of the things. He coined this concept family resemblance.
I can think of no better expression to characterize these similarities than “family resemblances”;… And I shall say: ‘games’ form a family.
Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein, 1953, p. 32
Wittgenstein didn’t think that words corresponded to things. The function and the meaning of a word were determined by its use. Definition is not something prior to the use of a word that fixes its meaning and determines how it will be used, but rather a descriptive tool that reflects the various ways a word is used:
Think of the tools in a tool-box: there is a hammer, pliers, a saw, a screwdriver, a rule, a glue-pot, nails and screws. — The functions of words are as diverse as the functions of these objects.
Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein, 1953, p. 6
Wittgenstein saw language merely as a tool used to accomplish everyday goals and activities, which essentially determine a word’s meaning. He called these activities language-games, because the rules of language were like the rules of a game, and saying something was like making a move in a game.
Here the term “language-game” is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life.
Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein, 1953, p. 11
While our brains naturally associate pictures to words, even when thinking of abstract ones like justice or soul, words in reality don’t tell us anything about the true nature of the thing they represent. Wittgenstein’s main point was to escape from our mental images when dealing with philosophy because everyone had a different image that clouds reality.
A picture held us captive. And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language and language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably.
Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein, 1953, p. 48
On the other hand, even if one could find an essential definition of a word, this would not undermine Wittgenstein’s argument. Wittgenstein isn’t necessarily against definitions, because in many cases essential definitions do exist and are even needed, typically in scientific contexts. But he just does not think all words must have an essential definition, so he suggests the concept of family resemblance. This raises the question: How can we know which terms have essential definitions and which do not? Wittgenstein’s claim makes defining a concept easier by lowering the expectations of what is required, but the challenge is to remain precise.
Wittgenstein valued clarity more than universal truth, which really made him stand out as a philosopher. Philosophers generally ask why to uncover hidden truths and consider that this is the most profound they can do. Wittgenstein, on the other hand, deemed looking as much profounder and saw it as a great difficulty because one must learn to ignore many preconceptions that cloud our judgment. Wittgenstein claiming that there is no shared constituent in knowledge would typically be reprimanded by most philosophers, particularly Socrates, because he gives up in the search for truth. While Wittgenstein does give valid answers to many of philosophy’s questions, he also inevitably raises further questions, like which terms have essential definitions and which do not. Much like in Socrates’ case, there is still work left to do in this regard. But in response to many of his critics, Wittgenstein would say:
The mystical is not how the world is, but that it is.
Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 1922
